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The widespread use of Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) is not a new phenomenon 
in the twenty-first century.  Although ART is most commonly used to treat infertility,1 it is 
increasingly used both to prevent the transmission of sex-linked genetic disorders to offspring2 and 
to allow same-sex couples to have genetic offspring.3  ART treatments and procedures use donor 
eggs, donor sperm, or embryos that have been previously frozen.4  
Infertility is defined as the inability to achieve pregnancy after one year of unprotected 
intercourse.5  Infertility affects approximately ten percent of women in the United States ages 15-
44 (6.1 million),6 and it affects approximately seven percent of all men in their reproductive age.7  
It should be noted that infertility is also a natural consequence of aging, and it is becoming ever 
more common among generations marked by the habit of postponing child rearing to pursue other 
life goals, like a career and education.8  
 
1 See MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001191.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).   
2 John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg Donation , 39 Case W. 
Res. 1, 4 (1989).   
3See Gamete Donation: Current Practices, Public Opinion, and Unanswered Questions, ASRM: FERTILITY AND 
STERILITY, https://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(17)30305-9/fulltext (last visited Oct. 28, 2020) (explaining 
that as of 2017, thirty-three percent of donor sperm users were same-sex or transgender couples); see also LESBIAN 
AND GAY FAMILY BUILDING USING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 
https://www.resolvenewengland.org/2014/07/lesbian-and-gay-family-building-using-assisted-reproductive-
technologies-art/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (about the various options available for same-sex couples to genetically 
reproduce).  
4 See MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/assistedreproductivetechnology.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).  
5 MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001191.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).   
6 INFERTILITY, https://www.womenshealth.gov/a-z-
topics/infertility#:~:text=Women%20who%20can%20get%20pregnant,Control%20and%20Prevention%20(CDC) 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020).   
7 Francesco Lotti & Mario Maggi, Ultrasound of the Male Genital Tract, HUMAN REPRODUCTION UPDATE, (July 19, 
2014) https://flore.unifi.it/retrieve/handle/2158/956381/187679/HRU%20review%20Lotti%20and%20Maggi.pdf  
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020).  This study provides a detailed analysis of male infertility research and diagnostic 
techniques and results.   
8 Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation , 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 603, 612-13 (2003) (“infertility represents a natural consequence of aging, and demographers have noted a 
trend of deferred childbearing”).   
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This paper will discuss the topic of payment for gametes used in ART.  Although some 
countries have nationwide restrictions and outright prohibitions on payments for donated eggs and 
sperm,9 such restrictions and prohibitions would be unconstitutional in the United States.  This is 
because regulations restricting compensation generally reduce the availability of gametes, as 
people become less incentivized to donate.10  This, in turn, dampens the ability of people to utilize 
ART procedures to procreate.11  The recognized right to procreate, also known as “procreative 
liberty,”12 extends to the use of ART, and placing restrictions or prohibitions on gamete 
compensation is an infringement on procreative liberty because they will effectively diminish any 
meaningful opportunity to utilize ART for procreative purposes.13  Thus, any such regulations 
restricting compensation would be found unconstitutional in the United States.   
Section II of this paper will encompass an overview of the procedures by which eggs and 
sperm are donated and other information about commonly used ART procedures.  Section III will 
discuss the current state of regulation regarding compensation for gametes in the United States at 
the federal and state levels, as well as other sources of guidance in the industry.  Section IV will 
include an overview of laws and regulations in other countries, and the impact of these countries’ 
prohibitions and caps on compensation will be explained here, as well.   
As ART continues to become a more prevalent means of procreating, it is critical that there 
continue to be a meaningful ability to utilize ART.  As will be demonstrated by looking at the 
effect that restricting or banning compensation has had in foreign countries, a dearth of the bread 
 
9 See infra Section IV.   
10 See infra Section IV.B.   
11 See infra Section V. 
12 See generally Robertson, supra note 2.  Procreative liberty, as used here, is described as negative right against 
state interference with private decisions—more specifically, the decision to bear children.    
13 ART is also used to provide eggs, sperm, and embryos for research purposes.  While an argument can be made 
that there should not be any restrictions or prohibitions on payments for gametes used for research to ensure a ready 
supply of gametes to aid in the advancement of ART, the discussion of the constitutionality of the use of ART for 
research is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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and butter of ART—eggs and sperm—significantly hampers the use of ART. 14  Thus, Section V 
will encompass the argument that restrictions on payments for gametes is unconstitutional in the 
United States.    
II 
EGG AND SPERM DONATION FACTS AND FIGURES 
 
Egg and sperm donors in the United States are generally compensated for their contributions 
and/or time and effort.15  The amount of compensation for sperm donors is usually a fraction of 
that which is provided to egg donors.16  The reasons for this stark difference in payment lie in the 
time, effort, expense, and risks of each donation.  To better understand the arguments against  
restrictions and prohibitions on gamete compensation, one must first understand the egg and sperm 
donation processes.   
A. PROCEDURES AND PAYMENT FOR EGG DONATIONS  
 
The egg donation procedure is complex, but it can be broken down into four steps.17  The first 
step is an initial consultation and screening.18  This step includes a preliminary medical19 and 
 
14 See infra Section IV.B.  
15 See infra Section III.B.  As will be discussed, some states disallow payment for gametes themselves but allow 
compensation for the donor’s time, travel costs, and other expenses, while others have no laws regulating 
compensation.   
16 Compare Egg Donor Compensation, EGG DONOR AMERICA, https://www.eggdonoramerica.com/become-egg-
donor/egg-donor-compensation (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) [hereinafter EggDonorAmerica.com] (the egg donor fee 
typically ranges from $5000 to $10,000); and Egg Donor Compensation, CENTER FOR HUMAN REPRODUCTION (last 
updated Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/egg-donation/egg-donor-compensation/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2020) [hereinafter CenterforHumanReproduction.com] (some IVF centers compensate based on the 
number of eggs produced, up to $14,000, and high-demand donors are allowed to charge additional fees of $1000-
$2000); with Why Donate?, THE SPERM BANK OF CALIFORNIA, https://donors.thespermbankofca.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2020) [hereinafter TheSpermBankofCalifornia.com] (sperm donors earn up to $125 for each sperm sample  
and can earn between $400 and $600 a month).   
17 See The Ovum Donation Process, EGG DONATION PROCESS FOR RECIPIENTS, 
https://www.ucsfhealth.org/education/egg-donation-process-for-recipients (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).   
18 See id.; How Does Egg Donation Work?, EGG DONATION, INC., https://eggdonor.com/donors/egg-donation-
process/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).   
19 The medical evaluation includes blood tests for hormone levels, a  transvaginal ultrasound, and possibly a 
psychological screening.  The Egg Donation Process, EGG DONATION INC., https://eggdonor.com/donors/egg-
donation-process/egg-donation-screening/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
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physical evaluation.20  As far as what is mandated by the government regarding testing, the FDA 
requires testing for infectious diseases and screening for certain risk factors associated with the 
transmission of communicable diseases.21  The second step is a more in-depth medical screening.22  
This process includes genetic tests and blood draws.23   
The third step, synchronization and stimulation,24 is arguably the most important and stringent 
of the steps.  Here, the donor will begin a medication regimen, which will stimulate the donor’s 
ovaries to produce the eggs, and it typically starts with birth control pills to synchronize the donor’s 
monthly cycles with the intended mother’s or surrogate’s.25  The donor will then administer daily 
injections of hormones for two to three weeks, which will stimulate the development of follicles 
in the ovaries.26  These follicles contain the eggs.27  The injections will initiate maturation, which 
readies the egg for the final step: retrieval.28   
 
20 See id.; Egg Donation Process, EGG DONATION INC., https://eggdonor.com/donors/egg-donation-process/egg-
donation-screening/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
21 See What You Should Know,  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 5, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-
blood-biologics/safety-availability-biologics/what-you-should-know-reproductive-tissue-donation (last visited Oct. 
26, 2020).   
22 Egg Donation Process, EGG DONATION INC., https://eggdonor.com/donors/egg-donation-process/egg-donation-
screening/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
23 See id.  The blood draw will determine if the donor has any sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, hepatitis, and 
drug/nicotine testing.  Id.    
24 See id.   
25 See id.  Although beyond the scope of this paper, there are interesting arguments regarding the legality and ethics 
of payment for surrogate services.  For an overview of the current state of surrogacy laws and for arguments 
surrounding those laws, see generally Austin Caster, Note, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid 
Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime , 10 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477 (2011); Sital Kalantry, Regulating Markets for Gestational Care: Comparative 
Perspectives on Surrogacy in the United States and India , 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 685 (2018).   
26 See id.  These injections include Lupron, which shuts down the donor’s ovulation and may cause various side 
effects.  Id.  The donor will also administer hormone injections, such as Follistim, Gonal-F, or Menopur.  Id.  There 
is a final injection, which may either be HGC or Lupron, which will initiate the final stage of maturation and 
stimulate ovulation.  Id.  These injections may cause side effects that are normally mild and similar to those 
associated with premenstrual syndrome (PMS).  Id.   
27 See id.  
28 See id.  
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The egg retrieval process lasts between twenty and thirty minutes and requires one to two 
hours of postoperative recovery.29  During the operation, the donor is sedated and given pain 
medications, and the doctor will locate the follicles.30  Once located, the doctor will insert a long 
needle into the vagina wall and into the follicles to retrieve the eggs.31  Usually, multiple eggs will 
be retrieved in one go.32 
As demonstrated by the above four steps, the egg donation process requires the donor’s time, 
commitment to following all required regimens, and assumption of the risk of side effects.  Due to 
the rigorous and sometimes unpleasant nature of the egg donation process, an egg donor is usually 
paid a large sum of money.33  In the United States, payment ranges from $5000 to $14,000 
depending on the clinic and donor.34  Although there may exist some female donors who are 
motivated to donate for altruistic purposes,35 women are most often motivated by monetary 
compensation.36 
B. PROCEDURES AND PAYMENT FOR SPERM DONATIONS 
 
 
29 See id.  
30 See In Vitro Fertilization: Egg Retrieval , MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-
fertilization/details/what-you-can-expect/rec-20206943 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
31 See id.  If the eggs cannot be retrieved through the vagina wall because the follicles are not accessible, then an 
incision will be made in the abdomen to retrieve the eggs.  See id.   
32 See id.   
33 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market, 72 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 66 (2009).  Prices for egg donor compensation in the United States have been reported to 
range from $1500 to $150,000, but surveys of fertility clinics have found that the average compensation rates  per 
donation cycle are $4217, and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (“SART”) has reported an average 
compensation rate of $5200.  See id.  Krawiec warns that these are self-reported numbers, so they must be 
approached with caution.  See id.  She notes, however, that these figures are the “most reliable pricing data 
available,” and further bolstering the data’s reliability is the threat of SART de -listing a clinic or agency that fails to 
comply with ASRM guidelines regarding compensation.  See id.  That is, the threat of being de-listed from SART’s 
national clinic registry incentivizes SART-member clinics to report pricing data.  See id.   
34 See EggDonorAmerica.com, supra note 15; CenterforHumanReproduction.com, supra note 15.  Egg donors who 
have successfully donated in the past can usually charge higher fees.  See id.    
35 See M. Elliott Neal, Note, Protecting Women: Preserving Autonomy in the Commodification of Motherhood , 17 
WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 611, 614 (2011) (citing Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: 
Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61-63 (2009)).   
36 See id. (citing Vanessa L. Pi, Note, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation is Not the 
Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 382 (2009)).  
 7 
The sperm donation process is much less complex, invasive, and time-consuming than the 
egg donation process.  As mentioned above, the FDA requires basic medical screening of donors.37  
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) recommends additional screenings 
such as age, a physical exam, semen testing, genetic testing, family medical history, psychological 
evaluation, and personal and sexual history.38  The actual donation is usually done at the sperm 
bank, and there the donor will provide a semen sample in a sterile cup in the privacy of the 
bathroom or another private room.39   
Most sperm banks pay for each ejaculate that meets the minimum sperm count.40  Donors 
typically earn between $35 and $125 per donation and can earn up to $1500 a month for their 
sperm.41  Similar to egg donors, most sperm donors are motivated by the promise of payment rather 
than altruism.42  
The need for gamete donors will continue to increase as the use of ART in the United States 
becomes more popular every year.  ART use has nearly doubled in the past decade.43  
Approximately 1.9% of all infants born in the United States are conceived through ART.44  The 
CDC reported that over 306,197 ART cycles were performed at 456 reporting clinics in the United 
States in 2018, resulting in 81,478 live born infants.45  This number will only go up in the future, 
as the potential demand for ART outweighs its current use.46  Thus, society has an interest in 
 
37 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, supra note 21.   
38 See Sperm Donation, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/sperm-donation/about/pac-
20395032 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
39 See id.   
40 See TheSpermBankofCalifornia.com, supra note 15. 
41 9 Ways to Make Money by Selling Your Body to Science , BUSINESS INSIDER, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/ways-to-make-money-from-medical-research-and-donations-2013-12 (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2020).    
42 See EggDonorAmerica.com, supra note 15.   
43 See Art Success Rates, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last updated Sept. 2, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
44 See id.   
45 See id.  
46 See id.  
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ensuring a steady supply of eggs and sperm in the future, and this will generally require the 
availability of people who are willing and able to donate.   
C. COMMON ART PROCEDURES  
Two of the most prominent ART techniques are artificial insemination (AI) and in vitro 
fertilization (IVF).47  AI is the process by which sperm is deposited into the fallopian tube of a 
woman who is ovulating.48  This is done to maximize the chances that an egg becomes fertilized, 
and AI is often used to overcome the male fertility issue, which is sometimes low sperm count or 
impaired mobility of the sperm.49  IVF is the process by which eggs are fertilized with sperm in 
the laboratory and then implanted into the uterus.50  This process is used to overcome female 
fertility issues.  Importantly, both techniques allow one or both of the parents to maintain a genetic 
tie to the resulting child.51  This genetic tie is often the driving force behind the increasingly 
widespread use of ART.  
III 
CURRENT STATE OF COMPENSATION REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The United States, relative to other countries, has a pronounced lack of regulation regarding 
the use of reproductive technology52 and, more specifically, regarding payment for gametes.  Most 
infertility research is not funded by the federal government, so the players in the fertility industry—
physicians, researchers, and clinics—have the freedom to formulate their own policies53 with 
 
47 See Assisted Reproductive Technology, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/infertility/conditioninfo/treatments/art  (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).   
48 See id.     
49 See id.    
50 See id.   
51 See id.   
52 What Policies Govern Egg Donation? , INFERTILITY TREATMENT: AN OVERVIEW, 
https://web.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/reprotech/New%20Ways%20of%20Making%20Babies/eggpol.htm  
(last visited Oct. 26, 2020).   
53 See id. 
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respect to all aspects of ART.  Whether a lack of government regulation regarding all aspects of 
ART is desirable is a complicated debate and requires much more information beyond what this 
paper can provide.   
Instead, what will be discussed is whether widespread regulation specifically about 
compensation for gamete donors is desirable and, more importantly, constitutional.  To begin to 
frame the answer to this important question, this section will describe the current regulations and 
guidance—or lack thereof—promulgated by the federal government, state governments, and other 
non-governmental entities.  
A. THE FEDERAL (NON)REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: A BLANK CANVASS  
The regulatory history of the United States regarding reproductive services encapsulates a 
respect for the autonomy of the doctor-patient relationship.54  It is because of this principle, in 
combination with both Congress’s instruction in the Fertility Clinic Success Rate Act of 1992 
(“FCSRCA”) to leave to the discretion of the medical doctors the proper standards, and Congress’s 
declaration that ART is beyond the reach of the FDA and other federal agencies,55 that the federal 
regulatory landscape is bare.  Furthermore, authors and scholars have opined that the lack of 
 
54 See Danielle A. Vera, Note, R-Egg-Ulation: A Call for Greater Regulation of the Big Business of Human Egg 
Harvesting, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 391, 406 (2016) (citing Philip M. Rosoff & Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The 
Case for Legal Regulation of Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 659 (2011) (“This 
society has a strong tradition of deference to physicians’ autonomy and judgement in the context of the physician -
patient relationship.”).  
55 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-2(i)(1)(2000) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (“In developing the certification 
program, the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services] may not establish any regulation, 
standard, or requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in an 
assisted reproductive technology program.”).  The FTC also has a role in investigating deceptive claims made by 
healthcare providers, including ART providers.  See Vera, supra note 54 at 408.  The FTC has entered into multiple 
cease-and-desist orders after proving that there had been “unfair or deceptive practices” regarding certain providers’ 
use of aggressive advertising practices to consumers.  See id.   This does not make a large impact on the industry’s 
marketing practices, however, because the FTC has been able to penalize only a small fraction of the ART industry 
players.  See id.   
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federal regulation may result from lawmakers’ restricted ability due to the absence of federal 
funding, and lack of desire caused by complex constitutional issues, to closely regulate ART.56   
As briefly mentioned, this restricted legislative ability may be a result of legal precedent 
regarding the fundamental right of procreation.57  In fact, this very reason for the lack of federal 
regulation was mentioned in a report from the President’s Council on Bioethics, Reproduction, 
and Responsibility in 2004.58  As this report suggests, there is a complex relationship between 
abortion and ART due to the tiny, yet crucially important element that they share: the embryo. 
The ongoing debate centers around the status of the embryo—that is, whether it should be 
granted personhood.59  Granting personhood to embryos would have major implications for both 
abortion and ART, and more specifically IVF, because of the use and potential storage of 
embryos.60  Thus, the destiny of Roe v. Wade, the seminal case that enshrined the pregnant 
woman’s liberty to have an abortion free from excessive governmental interference, 61 will control 
 
56 See Vera, supra note 54 at 406-07. (“A limitation on federal funding for procreative exercise leaves IVF clinics 
separated not only from the Congressional purse but, notably, from the federal oversight that attaches to such 
Congressional funding.  As a result, federal regulations designed to protect women . . . have not been meaningfully 
applied to ART”). 
57 See Vera, supra note 54 at 406-07.   
58 See The President’s Council on Bioethics, Reproduction & Responsibility: The Regulation of New 
Biotechnologies 8 (Mar. 2004) (available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/  pcbe 
final reproduction and responsibility.pdf) (“The 2004 report . . . listed as a probable reason for the lack of regulation 
regarding ART is that proposed efforts to regulate or monitor assisted reproduction are viewed by many people 
through the prism of Roe v. Wade . . . .  Defenders of reproductive freedom want no infringement of the right to 
make personal reproductive decisions . . . .  This situation creates a powerful disincentive for any regulation of the 
uses of reproductive technologies.”).   
59 See Lauren B. Paulk, Article, Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Technology in International 
Human Rights Law, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 781, 782 (2014).   
60 See id at 783.  It is a  common and widespread practice to fertilize multiple eggs at a  time during IVF in order to 
increase the chances of a viable pregnancy.  See id.  Because the egg process retrieval is complex and potentially 
dangerous, rather than repeat the process, people choose to freeze the remaining embryos for future use.  Id.  Paulk 
explains that were these embryos granted personhood status, the frozen embryos could be considered people with 
constitutional rights, and therefore the “[d]isposal or destruction of these embryos would be tantamount to murder, 
potentially for both the parents and the medical personnel assisting in the IVF process.”  Id. 
61 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).   
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the ability of women to have an abortion as well as the ability of women and couples to conceive 
using ART.62   
But, as Roe v. Wade continues to check the federal government’s capacity to impinge on the 
right of women to make important choices about their bodies and futures, it has also disincentivized 
federal regulators from peripherally involving themselves in the closely connected world of ART.  
And as federal regulation of the ART industry is lacking overall, there is virtually no regulation 
with respect to compensation for gametes.  Because federal law and guidance has left the states 
wanting, some states have attempted to fill in the gaps, and this will be the subject of the next 
subsection. 
B. THE STATE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: A COLORFUL CANVASS  
Donor compensation is regulated in some, but not all states.  There are no recognized trends 
among the states toward any particular type of regulatory scheme in general and with respect to 
compensation.63  The states that have enacted regulations regarding the use of ART have mixed 
approaches.64  Some states have passed blanket prohibitions on payments for donations involving 
eggs or embryos, without considering the consequences.65  Other states, like New York, prohibit 
direct payment for gametes themselves, but allow for payment for the donor’s time and 
 
62 See Margaret Marsh & Wanda Ronner, Why New Anti-Abortion Laws May Make It Harder to Conceive, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2019, 6:00AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/15/why-new-anti-
abortion-laws-may-make-it-harder-conceive/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2020), for a discussion about the potential impact 
that changing abortion laws may have on the ability to conceive via ART.  
63 See Neal, supra note 35, at 619; see also Kitty L. Cone, Eggs for Sale: The Scrambled State of Legislation in the 
Human Egg Market, 35 UALR L. REV. 189, 189 (2012) (comparing legislation among the states).   
64 See THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES 26 (March 2004), ch. 2, available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/ (providing a summary of 
state laws regarding ART).   
65 See e.g., GA. Code Ann. §16-12-160 (2008) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to buy or sell, to offer to buy or sell, or to 
assist another in buying or selling or offering to buy or sell a  human body or any part of a human body or buy or sell 
a human fetus or any part thereof.”).; LA. Stat. Ann. §9:122 (2017) (“The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human 
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”); OKLA. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §556 (2000) (classifying as human 
trafficking in children the human embryo that is at any time offered for sale or sold).  
 12 
inconvenience associated with the donation,66 yet other states allow for “reasonable” compensation 
without defining “reasonable.”67  Many states have not passed regulations concerning payment for 
gamete donations.68  Finally, some state legislatures outlaw compensation for gametes based on 
the purpose of the donation.  That is, they recognize a distinction between gametes donated for 
reproductive purposes and gametes donated for medical research, and most ban compensation for 
research purposes.69   
Besides a few states’ attempts at regulating certain aspects of gamete compensation, such 
regulations are few and far between.  In any event, it is not clear how effective the laws of any one 
state are because those wishing to circumscribe the laws of a regulated state may simply travel to 
another state where there are no such regulations.  Since the states as a whole are largely incapable 
of regulating the industry, the burden of oversight has been taken on by professional organizations, 
discussed next.   
C. THE SELF-REGULATED ART INDUSTRY STANDARDS: AN IGNORED CANVASS  
As the federal and state governments have mostly left the ART regulatory canvass blank, ART 
industry standards typically come from elsewhere.  Professional medical societies, like the 
 
66 See NY Fam. Ct. Act. §581-502 (McKinney 2021) (“Compensation may be paid to a donor . . . based on medical 
risks, physical discomfort, inconvenience and the responsibilities they are undertaking in connection with their 
participation in the assisted reproduction.  Under no circumstances may compensation be paid to purchase gametes 
or embryos . . . .”).   
67 See e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.14 (West 2016) (“Only reasonable compensation directly related to the donation of 
eggs, sperm, and preembryos shall be permitted.”); VA. Code Ann. § 20 -156 (West 2017) (defining “compensation” 
for donors as “payment of any valuable consideration fo r services in excess of reasonable medical and ancillary 
costs).  
68 As of 2012, these states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, D.C., Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming.  See Cone, supra note 63 at 217-26 (listing findings of Fifty State Survey in Appendix A).    
69 See Vera, supra note 54, at 410; see e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 111L, § 8 (2005) (“No person shall 
knowingly and for valuable consideration purchase, sell, transfer or otherwise obtain human embryos, gametes or 
cadaveric tissue for research purposes.  Nothing in this section shall prohibit a  person from banking or donating their 
gametes for personal future use, or from donating their gametes to another person or from donating their gametes to 
research.”) 
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American Society of Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) and Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (“SART”), play a role in shaping the industry practices.70  ASRM is a 
multidisciplinary organization that strives to advance the science and practice of reproductive 
medicine.71  ASRM promulgates practice guidelines and ethics statements regarding ART, and it 
requires its members to abide by such guidelines in order to maintain membership status.72 
The other related and major player in ART standard-setting is SART.  SART is affiliated with 
ASRM, and it is an organization of professionals that establish and maintain standards for ART.73  
Many ART clinics in the United States are members of SART74 and, similar to ASRM, in order to 
maintain membership status, SART requires that the clinics adhere to SART’s standards and 
guidelines.75   
Although many clinics and agencies are associated with ASRM and SART, the problem with 
the guidelines and standards promulgated by these organizations is that non-compliance results in 
nothing more than a de-listing on the organization’s member-page.76  Thus, compliance with the 
 
70 See Vera, supra note 54, at 411-12.  In addition to disseminating guidance with respect to ART industry standards 
and practice, the CDC commissioned SART to collect data by implementing reporting requirements.  See id.  These 
reporting requirements are mandatory and require member clinics and agencies to report fertility success rates and 
other information under the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.  See id.  In 1997 the CDC, 
with the help of SART, was able to publish the first annual Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates 
Report, which provided statistics from 1995.  See Archived ART Reports and Spreadsheets, CENTER FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/archive.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).   
71 See History of ASRM, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, https://www.asrm.org/about-us/history-
of-asrm/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (discussing the history of ASRM, including its founding, activities and 
achievements, journals, publications, and member groups).   
72 See id; see also Vera, supra note 54, at 411-12 (highlighting the fact that SART and ASRM promote standards of 
practice of ART to benefit patients and members of society at large, but those who do not receive these benefits are 
the suppliers—that is, those individuals that supply eggs and sperm for use in the ART industry).    
73 See What is SART?, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, https://www.sart.org/patients/what-is-
sart/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).   
74 See id.  (“The organization represents the majority of ART clinics in the country. . . . In 2018, eighty -six percent 
of IVF clinics in the United States were members of SART.”).  
75 See id.  SART also reports birth outcome data from its member clinics, including likelihood and success with 
different treatment options, and its professionals interact with members of Congress regarding pending litigation that 
may have an impact on ART.   
76 See Krawiec, supra note 33, and accompanying text. 
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guidelines is noncompulsory, and the guidelines are often disregarded.77  In 2000, ASRM did, in 
fact, promulgate compensation guidelines,78 but as the result of a lawsuit filed against ASRM 
alleging a violation of anti-trust laws, ASRM was required to amend its guidelines to remove its 
recommended compensation amounts.79  Therefore, even if either organization currently had 
guidelines regarding compensation for donors, there is no guarantee that they would be allowed 
under anti-trust law or meaningfully followed.   
Although these professional organizations have developed respectable and principled  
guidelines, because the guidelines do not have binding effect on the practice of ART, particularly 
with regard to compensation, their impact on ART industry practices remains unclear.   
IV 
COMPENSATION REGULATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
This Section will explore the much more comprehensive laws of other countries that regulate 
the use of ART and, more specifically, compensation for gametes.  The motivating factors behind 
the regulation of gamete compensation in these countries include ethical concerns about the 
 
77 See Vera, supra note 54, at 412 (citing Michael Hiltzik, Should We Pay Women to Donate Their Eggs for 
Research? No, and Here’s Why, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la -fi-hiltzik-
egg-donors-20160722-snap-story.html.). Vera points out that SART even admits that its guidelines are not suitable 
for total reliance because medical science and ethics are constantly changing.  See id. at 413, 413 n. 176.   
78 See Ethics Committee of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007).  These guidelines stated that an oocyte donor should not be paid more than 
$5000 and that payment of more than $10,000 is “beyond what is appropriate.”  Id.  
79 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Egg-Donor Price Fixing and Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, AMA JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 57 (Jan. 2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-
assn.org/files/2018-05/pfor1-1401.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).  The lawsuit was brought in 2011 by an egg donor 
on behalf of herself and other egg donors.  See id.  The suit alleged that the donor compensation guidelines were an 
illegal price-fixing agreement in violation of antitrust law, and that they presented a risk of anticompetitive effects—
that is, product scarcity, which will drive up the price of eggs.  See id at 58.  ASRM argued that the price caps had 
the opposite effect—that they were, in fact, procompetitive—because “enhancing the safety and social acceptability 
of the egg donation process may encourage women to donate eggs and help promote the view among those affected 
by infertility that the use of donated oocytes is a safe and responsible treatment, thus improving the market.”  Id at 
59.  Ultimately, ASRM was required to amend its guidelines to remove the paragraphs that contained the 
compensation guidelines.  See generally Kamakahi v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. 
Tech., No: 3:11-CV-1781 JCS, 2016 U.S. District. LEXIS 186798 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016).   
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exploitation of donors, particularly egg donors, and the commodification of gametes.80  In 2004, 
the European Union (“EU”) issued a directive to the members of the EU regarding human tissues 
and cells.81  The Directive instructed Member States that they are to ensure that compensation will 
be limited to reasonable expenses incurred by the donor and that tissues and cells must be procured 
on a non-profit basis.82   
The United Kingdom, as well as other European countries have since implemented regulations 
in compliance with the Directive.83  Countries outside of the EU have also implemented regulations 
restricting compensation for gametes, including Canada.84  This Section will discuss the laws of 
the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively,85 and it will then explore the impact of these laws 
on the countries’ gamete markets.86  Understanding the impacts of compensation restrictions in 
foreign countries is important for understanding the impact that widespread prohibitions and 
restrictions on compensation for gametes might have in the United States.87 
A. THE LAWS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES  
The laws that will be discussed here are those enacted under the United Kingdom’s Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Act (“the HFE Act”)88 and Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction 
 
80 See Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free Trade in Human Reproductive Cells: A Solution to Procreative Tourism and the 
Unregulated Internet, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L.  263, 271 (2006).  These ethical considerations will be addressed in 
Section V, infra.   
81 Council Directive 2004/23, art. 4, On Setting Standards of Quality and Safety for the Donation, Procurement, 
Testing, Processing, Preservation, Storage and Distribution of Human Tissues and Cells, 2004 O.J. (L102) 52 (EU) 
[hereinafter Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council].   
82 “Member States shall endeavor to ensure voluntary and unpaid donations of tissues and cells.  Donors may receive 
compensation, which is strictly limited to making good the expenses and inconveniences related to the donation.  In 
that case, Member States define the conditions under which compensation may be granted.”  Id. at art. 12; see also 
Chung, supra note 80.  
83 See Chung, supra note 80.   
84 See Chung, supra note 80, at 272.  
85 See infra Section IV.A. 
86 See infra Section IV.B. 
87 See infra Section V. 
88 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 1, 2A, 3, 4, 5 -10, 41 (Eng.) [hereinafter HFE Act].   
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Act (“the AHR Act”).89  Both sets of laws include restrictions on payment for gametes.90  These 
laws, however, are less restrictive than the laws of some other countries, which ban all aspects of 
compensation for gametes.91 
The United Kingdom’s HFE Act was enacted by the U.K. Parliament in part to gain control 
over the use and development of human embryos and to prohibit certain practices regarding 
embryos and gametes.92  The HFE Act also created the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (“HFEA”), the regulatory body charged with carrying out the HFE Act’s provisions.93   
The HFEA regulates clinics that offer ART-related procedures or store eggs, sperm, or 
embryos by inspecting all such clinics in the U.K.94 and granting licenses that are subject to 
revocation.95  The HFEA’s Code of Practice, published in October of 2018, provides that centers 
may compensate sperm donors up to £35 per clinic visit96 and egg donors up to £750 per cycle of 
 
89 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004, S.C., ch. 2, 5 (Can.) [hereinafter AHR Act].   
90 See HFE Act, supra note 88, at c. 12, 41; ARH Act, supra note 89.   
91 See Rebecca Lennon Baskin, Note, Re-Evaluating Egg Donation: Why the United States Should Eliminate the 
Competitive Marketplace for Donated Eggs and Create Federal Regulations that Promote Informed Consent, 19 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 571, 586-87 (2018) (describing the laws of various European countries).  Examples of 
countries that ban compensation for gamete donation altogether include Spain, see Regulations Governing Egg and 
Sperm Donation in Spain, INVITRA, https://www.invitra.com/en/regulations-governing-egg-and-sperm-donation-in-
spain/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2020), and Denmark, see Egg Donation, COPENHAGEN FERTILITY CENTER, 
https://www.copenhagenfertilitycenter.com/uk/behandlingen/gdonation.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).   
92 See HFE Act, supra note 88, at c. 37.  The HFE Act defines an embryo as either “a live human embryo where 
fertilization is complete,” id. at §1(1)(a), or “an egg in the process of fertilization.”  Id. at § 1(1)(b).   
93 See HFE Act, supra note 88, at c. 5-10; see also Chung, supra note 80, at 271-72 
94 See HFE Act, supra note 88, at c. 8; see also Chung, supra note 80, at 271-72 n. 51.   
95 See HFE Act, supra note 88, at c. 11.  See also Donna M. Gitter, Am I My Brother’s Keeper? The Use of 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Donor of Transplantable Stem Cells for an Older Sibling Suffering 
from a Genetic Disorder, 13 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 975, 980 (2006) (describing the duties of the HFEA).   
96 See Donating Your Sperm, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, 
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/donation/donors/donating-your-sperm/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2020) [hereinafter HFEA 
Sperm Donation].   
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donation to cover the donor’s costs.97  No direct payments for gametes are allowed,98 and the 
permitted cost-covering payments are substantially lower than that received by both egg and sperm 
donors in the United States.   
In Canada, the AHR Act makes it illegal to purchase human gametes from donors.99  Like in 
the U.K., payments are permitted for the reasonable reimbursement of the donor’s expenses.100  
The penalties for violating the provisions of the AHR Act are severe.  They include a fine of up to 
$500,000, a prison sentence of up to ten years, or both.101  
B. THE IMPACT OF COMPENSATION REGULATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
This subsection will explore the effects that the gamete compensation laws have had in various 
countries.102  These effects include diminished incentives to donate gametes,103 a corresponding 
reduction in the national supply of gametes,104 and the rise of  “procreative tourism”105 due to 
inadequate local gamete supplies in regulated countries.  All such consequences negatively impact 
 
97 See Donating Your Eggs, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, 
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/donation/donors/donating-your-eggs/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2020) [hereinafter HFEA Egg 
Donation].  In addition, the HFEA provides that “[c]enters must not accept an individual as a donor who is known 
(or reasonably suspected) by tha t center to have received or to be about to receive money or other benefits not in line 
with HFEA Directions.”  See Payments for Donors, CODE OF PRACTICE, Guidance note 13, 
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/media/2565/hfea-draft-code-of-practice-9th-edition-consultation-version.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2020).   
98 See HFEA Sperm Donation, supra note 96; HFEA Egg Donation, supra note 97.      
99 See HRA Act, supra note 89, at ch. 5(3). 
100 See HRA Act, supra note 89; see also Chung, supra note 80, at 272 n. 54 (“Receipted expenditures include 
medical costs and other physical care expenses, including medication, gas and maternity clothes, but exclude time 
away from work and family, or medical risk or inconvenience.”).   
101 See HRA Act, supra note 89, at ch. 61; see also Françoise Baylis, Enforcing the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act (May 2012), DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY, https://www.dal.ca/academics/programs/undergraduate/canadian.html 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2020).  
102 It should be noted that these effects may also be due in part to the enactment of donor anonymity laws, which 
prohibit the anonymity of donor gametes.   
103 See Neal, supra note 35, at 614 (“Most anonymous [sperm] donors are motivated primarily by the promise of 
compensation.”).; id. at 616 (“Women undergoing the ovum donation procedure for purposes other than to create a 
child of their own are often motivated by monetary compensation. Many donors also state that they are motivated by 
the thought of helping infertile women conceive a child, but there is significant evidence that his is largely untrue.”).  
104 Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation , 2001 B.Y.U.L. REV. 107, 
159-60 (2001) (“The empirical evidence is clear: supply does not meet demand when donor compensation is 
regulated.”).   
105 See Chung, supra note 80, at 272 (citing B.M. Knoppers & S. Lebris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted 
Conception: Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 329-61 (1991)).  
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the meaningful opportunity to utilize ART in these countries.106  One can conclude that similar 
restrictions on payment for gametes in the United States, the constitutionality of which will be 
discussed in the next section,107 will result in the same consequences.   
Of the most alarming consequences of regulations and prohibitions on gamete compensation 
is the corresponding shortages of gametes.108  This has a particularly acute effect on the supply of 
eggs.109  Women who donate eggs require financial incentives likely due to the negative aspects 
and risks of the egg donation procedures.110  There is also evidence that male donors require 
financial incentives to donate111 because, despite the less complex sperm donation procedure,112 
male donors still incur costs for the time, effort, and inconvenience associated with sperm 
donation.113  Evidence shows that the restrictions placed on gamete compensation in the U.K. and 
Canada, as well as other nations, have led to shortages in the supply of both eggs and sperm,114 so 
 
106 See generally Baum, supra note 104 (discussing the impact of gamete compensation regulations on infertile 
couples’ ability to access donors of their choice, or even donors at all, thus restricting their ability to achieve their 
reproductive goals through the use of ART).   
107 See infra Section V.   
108 See Chung, supra note 80, at 269-70 n. 42.  Chung explains that “the relationship between gamete shortages and 
capped compensation is based on circumstantial evidence rather than a proven direct correlation,” and that “there 
may be other factors, such as local social norms and religious beliefs, to explain a low number of gamete donors 
where payment is regulated.”  Id. (citing Baum, supra note 104, at 158-60).  Despite the circumstantial nature of the 
correlation, like Chung and Baum, who proceeded “based on the logic and evidence that gamete supply is affected 
by financial incentives,” id., I will proceed on the same logic; see also Gina Kolata, Price of Donor Eggs Soars, 
Setting Off a Debate on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at A1 (discussing the effects of a severely reduced egg 
supply in Japan due to the Japanese ban on paid egg donation); American RadioWorks: The Fertility Race (Part 8), 
No Money for Eggs (American Public Media radio broadcast), available at 
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/fertility_race/part8/ [hereinafter American Public Media] 
(discussing the necessity of imports of eggs to the United Kingdom from the United States du e to the egg shortage 
created by the U.K. ban on paid egg donations).   
109 See Krawiec, supra note 30, at 62.  Countries like the United Kingdom, Japan, and China, that have banned 
compensation for egg donation have subsequently encountered a lack of donors and severe oocyte shortages.  See id.  
Krawiec describes this as “the true limit to women’s altruistic nature.”  Id.; see also Kolata, supra note 108; 
American Public Media, supra note 108.   
110 See supra Section II.A.; Chung, supra note 80, at 269.   
111 See EggDonorAmerica.com, supra note 12.   
112 See supra Section II.B.  
113 See Chung, supra note 80, at 268-69.   
114 See Baum, supra note 104, at 159 n. 133 (“[C]omparisons between the United States, with its unregulated 
compensation, and England and Israel, with their regulated compensation, yield powerful evidence on the supply 
side effects of donor compensation schemes.  It is also clear that within the United States compensation scheme 
affects supply. . . . Clearly, compensation has a direct effect on supply , but the magnitude of that effect remains 
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it can be inferred that less people are choosing to donate, or more people are choosing to donate 
less often, at least in part due to the reduced financial incentive.   
“Procreative tourism,” a growing phenomenon, is defined as “traveling by candidate service 
recipients from one institution, jurisdiction, or country where treatment is not available to another 
institution, jurisdiction, or country where they can obtain the kind of medically assisted 
reproduction they desire.”115  Another related event is the necessary importation of gametes into a 
country.116  Due to the above-described shortages in supply of gametes, potential parents in the 
U.K., Canada, and other countries may face wait times of up to five years to access the particular 
gametes they desire, let alone any gametes at all.117  These significant wait times and limited 
gamete selections have led to a drastic increase in procreative tourism and gamete importation in 
regulated countries.   
Fertility clinics and gamete donors in countries with less restrictions benefit from the 
increased procreative tourism and gamete importation because international clients are seeking out 
 
unclear.”); see also Jeff Roberts, Allowing Compensation for Gamete Donors Will Restore Access to Fertility Care 
in Canada (Apr. 1, 2019), VANCOUVER SUN, https://vancouversun.com/opinion/op-ed/dr-jeff-roberts-allowing-
compensation-for-gamete-donors-will-restore-access-to-fertility-care-in-canada (last visited Oct. 28, 2020) 
(explaining that Canada’s ban on compensation to gamete donors has contributed to the shortage of individuals 
willing to donate sperm and eggs, and arguing for the legality of compensation for donors in order to restore 
Canada’s fertility market).   
115 See G. Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion , 28 J. MED. ETHICS 337, 337 (2002) 
(citing B.M. Knoppers & S. LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social 
Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 329-61 (1991)); Chung, supra note 80, at 290.  For the purposes of this paper, 
procreative tourism, in addition to encompassing the physical traveling aspect, also includes the purchase of gametes 
online from an outside institution, jurisdiction, or country.    
116 See Roberts, supra note 114 (explaining that gamete shortages has led to the importation of gametes from other 
countries).   
117 See, e.g., Susan Manfield, The Gift of Life, ABERDEEN PRESS & J. (Aberdeen, Scotland), Oct. 5, 1999, at 13 
(noting that the “desperate shortage of donors” has led to long waiting lists for oocytes); Kathleen Morgan, Babies 
for Sale, DAILY RECORD (Glasgow), Aug. 17, 1999, at 8 (noting the two-year waiting list for oocytes at a  clinic in 
Aberdeen); Jane Draper, IVF Donor Sperm Shortage Revealed , BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/5341982.stm (revealing that seventy-eight of the eight-five United Kingdom 
clinics included in a survey reported over a six month waiting period for clients).   
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these foreign donors at unprecedented rates.118  Despite this benefit to some unregulated countries, 
the overall effect of procreative tourism and gamete importation is undesirable.   
First, the international purchase of gametes between countries allows people to circumvent  
the more restrictive laws of their nation, thus frustrating the purpose of those laws.119  Second, 
international buyers of gametes must bear the costs of travel or importation of gametes,120 and 
those couples whose reproductive time-frames are shorter than their countries’ average wait 
period, who cannot afford such exorbitant costs, are essentially excluded from the ART market.   
Finally, the importation of donor gametes from unregulated countries where donors are paid 
in order to supplement regulated countries’ inadequate gamete supply creates a double standard in 
those countries.121  That is, countries with compensation restrictions have seen the number of 
treatments utilizing gametes donated from unpaid nationals shrink, while also seeing the number 
of treatments utilizing imported gametes from countries where donors are paid  exponentially more 
rise.122  Double standards such as this may have the effect of illegitimating the reasons for passing 
gamete compensation laws in the first place.     
These impacts are important to keep in mind when thinking about the constitutionality of 
payment restrictions and prohibitions in the United States.  All of the impacts discussed have a 
direct bearing on the ability to freely utilize ART.  This resulting inability to use ART is the crucial 
 
118 See Chung, supra note 80, at 290-91.  Another related benefit is the stimulation of providers’ economies because 
the “tourism” creates more business for clinics, and thus, creates more jobs and income.   
119 See Chung, supra note 80, at 291.  Chung notes that politicians have not been able to take action to prevent the 
circumvention of laws, and few states have enacted measures to punish such border crossers.  See id.  
120 See Chung, supra note 80, at 291.  Moreover, Chung notes that only thirty-four percent of ART procedures are 
successful, so the stakes are higher for those who spent the money to travel internationally.  See id.  According to 
Chung, “[i]f ART is a gamble anywhere, it becomes an even greater risk when attempted globally.”  Id.  
121 See Roberts, supra note 114.   
122 See Roberts, supra note 114 (noting that in 2017, sixty-five percent of egg donation treatments in Canada utilized 
eggs from anonymous U.S. donors, so many fertility clinics in Canada may be unwittingly participating in 
treatments that utilize the eggs of paid donors, despite the illegality of this practice).   
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element supporting the argument of this paper, which is that such restrictions and prohibitions are 
unconstitutional in the United States.123  This assertion will be developed in the next section. 
V 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON 
PAYMENT FOR GAMETES 
 
In order to explain the premise that restrictions and total bans on payment for gametes is 
unconstitutional in the United States, this section will consist of three subsections.  The first will 
make the argument that the right to procreate is a constitutional right124—that is, there exists for 
each individual the constitutional guarantee of “procreative liberty.”125  The second subsection will 
argue that procreative liberty extends to the use of ART.126  Finally, the last subsection will explain 
that given the two above propositions, and given that restrictions on payments lead to gamete 
shortages,127 placing restrictions on gamete compensation is an infringement on our constitutional 
right to procreate because such restrictions will effectively diminish any meaningful opportunity 
to utilize ART.128 
A. THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE  
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly recognized the right to procreate, one would 
have a difficult time arguing that procreative liberty has not been conceded by the Court in 
numerous opinions.  From the plentiful case history dealing with privacy and liberty, one can infer 
that the Court has read the Constitution to protect the right to procreate.129  The Court has 
 
123 See infra Section V.   
124 See infra Section V.A. 
125 John A. Robertson coined the term “procreative liberty.”  See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the 
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth , 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 457 (1983).   
126 See infra Section V.B. 
127 See supra Section IV.B.   
128 See infra Section V.C.   
129 See Robertson, supra note 125, at 414.  Robertson explains that even though many commentators have inferred 
that the Supreme Court’s broad statements in privacy cases support a right to obtain and raise children, a closer look 
reveals that no Supreme Court case addresses reproduction itself.  Id. at 415.  That is, in these cases, the Court works 
off the assumption that the children already exist, and that the parents have a right to raise them.  Id.  Robertson 
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recognized the right of individuals, married or single,130 to be free from government interference 
when it comes to making reproductive choices.131  The recognized rights of privacy and liberty in 
the contexts of marriage, procreation, contraception, and child rearing make up the sturdy 
backbone of the right to procreate. 
Like other fundamental rights, the honored right to procreate protects the individual and 
couples from unwarranted interference from the government.132  This protection is strong, but it is 
not absolute.  Also like other fundamental rights, insofar as the government has a compelling 
justification, it may interfere with the right to procreate to a certain extent.133  The substantive due 
process doctrine provides that states may not interfere with a fundamental liberty interest unless 
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.134  In other words, if the 
 
concludes that despite this fact, “the principles and doctrines espoused in two kinds of cases necessarily protect 
some measure of autonomy in bringing children into the world.”  Id.  Robertson goes on to explain that the first type 
of case involves contraception or abortion, and in these cases, the Court recognizes the right not to procreate.  Id. at 
415-16.  Robertson explains that the right to not have children implies the right to have children, as well.  Id.  The 
other type of case where the Court has impliedly recognized a right to procreate is that where the Court must 
determine who has the right to raise a child and the scope of such right.  Id.  Robertson concludes that “[t]he right to 
rear cannot . . . be easily divorced from the acts and decisions leading to the existence of the person to be reared.”  
Id. at 417.; see also Chung, supra note 80, at 286 n. 136.   
130 There is a strong argument that individuals, rather than just couples, have the right to procreate, as well.  
Robertson argues that because the right of single parents to bear and raise children that they have already conceived 
is firmly established, recognizing the right of a single person to conceive in the first place is only a marginal shift.  
See Robertson, supra note 125, at 418.  Moreover, he contends that no evidence exists tending to show that the 
marriage environment is essential to raising a child.  Id.  Additionally, Robertson points out that “[p]rocreation may 
be as central to a single person’s identity and life-plan as it is for a married person.”  Id.  That is, the decision to bear 
and beget a child is, for a single person, no less a private and fundamental life decision tha n it is for a married 
couple.   
131 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that “central to the liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment” is the intimate choices involved in procreation); Carey v. Population Services 
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing that the right to privacy entails the decision whether or not to bear 
or beget a child); Einstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (acknowledging the right to be free from governmental 
intrusion into the fundamental and priva te decision of whether to bear or beget a child); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535 (1942) (characterizing procreation as one of the “basic civil rights” of man).   
132 See Einstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (explaining that there exists “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child”) (emphasis removed).   
133 See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).  The Court in Glucksburg held that the Constitution 
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests,” which includes the right “to have children.”  Therefore, any attempt by the government to  interfere with 
the right to have children is subject to strict scrutiny.  See id.  
134 Id.  
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government does, indeed, have a compelling state interest, and the government’s infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest, then it may regulate the right to procreate in a 
limited manner.   
The way that the strict scrutiny test applies to government interference with the right to 
procreate using ART will be discussed below.135  More specifically, potential justifications will be 
introduced and analyzed, and this paper will conclude with the contention that no justification can 
be characterized as compelling enough to warrant restrictions or prohibitions on payment for 
gametes.136 
B. THE RIGHT TO USE ART TO PROCREATE 
All people have the right to procreate,137 including those who do not have the ability to 
procreate coitally.138  Both procreative liberty and the desire to maintain biological ties to children 
justify the existence of ART.139  There is a clear connection between the right to procreate and the 
use of ART because ART allows people who are otherwise incapable140 to have offspring.141  As 
 
135 See infra Section V.C.   
136 See infra Section V.C.   
137 It should be noted that the right to procreate is generally thought of as a negative right, meaning that it is the right 
to be free from government interference.  See Baum, supra note 104, at 113-114.  This is in contrast to a positive 
right, which entails the right to receive assistance from the government regarding the pursuit of reproduction.  See 
id.   
138 Robertson explains that “infertility should no more disqualify [coitally infertile couples] from reproductive 
experiences than physical disability should disqualify persons from walking with mechanical assistance.”  See 
Robertson, supra note 2, at 33-34.   
139 See Baum, supra note 104, at 115. The clearest case in which it is difficult to deny the right to procreate by 
utilizing ART is that of the infertile couple seeking to utilize ART to increase the chances of pregnancy.  See id.  
This is because both partners will maintain a genetic bond with the child.  See supra Section II.C.  Kenneth Baum 
contends, however, that in even those cases where an individual is unable or unwilling to produce his or her own 
gametes due to the possibility of transmitting genetic disorders to his or her offspring, the right to utilize ART is still 
justified.  See Baum, supra note 104, at 115.  Although one parent may not be genetically related to the child, one 
parent’s genetic connection to the child is the next best thing.  See id.   
140 This incapacity arises from infertility, the chance of passing on genetic disorders, and/or being involved in a 
same-sex relationship.   
141 Baum argues that adoption does not satisfy the right to procreate because it does not provide for the genetic ties 
that normally exist between parents and their offspring.  See Baum, supra note 104, at 114.  He explains that 
“[m]any individuals’ reproductive motivation stems in part from their perhaps narcissistic desire to pass on their 
genes, to use their genetic material to bring into the world a new being that shares and reflects their biologica l 
history.”  Id.   
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such, the ability to use ART is essential for those who need technological assistance to exercise 
their fundamental right to form a family.  
Although few, some courts across the country are beginning to recognize that the right to 
procreate extends to the use of ART.  For instance, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
opinion in Lifchez v. Hartigan that the right of “privacy and reproductive freedom as established 
in Roe v. Wade” is broad enough to encompass a right to use ART.142  Additionally, in another 
district court case, the court stated that “[t]o suggest that procreative rights do not encompass the 
use of medical technology ignores the fact that the right not to procreate through the use of 
contraception and the right to terminate a pregnancy necessarily require access to medical 
technology and assistance.”143  As the use of ART continues to rapidly grow, and as it is abundantly 
clear that a right to procreate exists,144 it is likely that more courts will move in the direction of 
cementing the idea that the right to procreate encompasses the use of ART.   
C. NO PAYMENT, NO ART, NO (PROCREATIVE) LIBERTY  
Individuals have a constitutionally protected right to procreate.  Any infringement on the right 
of individuals and couples to procreate coitally is subject to strict scrutiny.145  Individuals have a 
constitutionally protected right to procreate with the use of ART.146  It therefore follows that any 
infringement on the right to procreate using ART should be subject to the rigorous scrutiny that 
applies to government interference with the right to procreate coitally.147   
 
142 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d without opinion, 914 F.2d. 260 (7 th Cir. 1990).  This case dealt 
specifically with the use of IVF.  See id.       
143 T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d. 787 (Fla. District. Ct. App. 2011).  This was a case of first impression in Florida, 
and the issue was whether two women in a same-sex relationship share parental rights to a child born out of that 
relationship with the use of IVF.  See id.   
144 See supra Section V.A.   
145 See supra Section V.A.   
146 See supra Section V.B.   
147 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 9 n. 10.  Although there are many ways that the government can regulate ART in 
a potentially invasive manner, the following will discuss the regulation of compensation for gametes only.      
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Restricting or prohibiting payments for gametes constitutes an infringement on the right to 
procreate using ART.  By looking at the impacts that regulating payment for gametes has had on 
countries like the United Kingdom and Canada,148 and comparing that to the currently unregulated 
market in the United states where supply of gametes meets demand,149 one can conclude that the 
consequences of regulating compensation for gametes in the United States will be similar to those 
felt in regulated countries.150   
Regulating compensation, though intended to alleviate the current wealth distinction that 
gives the wealthy more expansive options in selecting a donor and generally utilizing ART, will 
have the actual effect of creating gamete scarcity for all.151  Scarcity of gametes in the United 
States will likely have the same effect that scarcity has had for individuals and couples in other 
countries hoping to utilize ART—that is, it will require costly travel to other countries without 
scarcity problems in order to avoid wait times.152  Therefore, this dramatically reduced supply of 
gametes will effectively preclude many individuals from accessing ART at all.153   
Financial incentives to donate are necessary to maintain an adequate supply of gametes.154  
Thus, it is clear that an unrestricted market that ensures payment to gamete donors is the only way 
to protect the right to procreate using ART because an increased supply of gametes creates a greater 
ability to access and utilize ART for all individuals and couples.   
 
148 See supra Section IV.B.   
149 See Baum, supra note 104, at 139.   
150 Kenneth Baum suggests that the United States’ current supply surplus will likely change if donor compensation 
was banned.  See Baum, supra note 104, at 150.  Although his argument focuses on the market for oocytes, the same 
logic applies to the market for sperm.   
151 See Baum, supra note 104, at 150.   
152 See supra Section IV.B.   
153 Baum contends that the current market-based donor compensation allows for more expansive options for those 
who are wealthy, but this wealth distinction is the lesser evil because the scarcity that results from compensation 
regulation will guarantee that some people do not have access to ART at all.  See Baum, supra note 104, at 150.    
154 See supra Section II.A-B.   
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Because the link between restrictions on compensation for gametes and reduced supply 
leading to limited access to ART is fairly apparent, such an infringement by the government on 
procreative liberty must be rigorously scrutinized.  John Robertson explains that “[o]nly serious 
harm to the interests of others, not avoidable by less restrictive means, should justify interference 
with” the right to make reproductive decisions.155  As will be discussed, none of the justifications 
that are often advanced can be considered compelling under strict scrutiny.   
Allowing compensation for gametes is often subjected to the criticism that such a practice is 
morally objectionable.  The violation of moral values, alone, is not a harm to society that can 
outweigh the right to reproduce.156  A common argument that falls under the moral violation 
umbrella is that allowing ART to flourish may psychologically harm offspring.157  This argument 
centers on the potential confusion stemming from the mismatch between the biological and social 
relation that a child of ART has with his or her parents, and there are also concerns that these 
children will have low self-esteem from discovering that he or she was “bought.”158   
These harms are merely speculative and unfounded, as research suggests that there is no 
cognitive impairment in ART-conceived children, nor are there difficulties with socioemotional 
development among these children as compared to naturally conceived children.159  Thus, this 
argument does not constitute a compelling justification for restricting payment for gametes.   
 
155 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 10-11.   
156 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 11; Chung, supra note 80, at 287.   
157 See Baum, supra note 104, at 156-57.   
158 See Baum, supra note 104, at 156-57.   
159 See generally Susan E. Golombok, Reproductive Technology and Its Impact on Child Psychosocial and 
Emotional Development, ENCYCLOPEDIA ON EARLY CHILD DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 2007), http://www.child-
encyclopedia.com/sites/default/files/textes-experts/en/887/reproductive-technology-and-its-impact-on-child-
psychosocial-and-emotional-development.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).  Dr. Susan E. Golombok summarizes the 
research on the cognitive, social, and emotional development of children in assisted reproduction families that 
utilized various ART procedures, like IVF and donor insemination.  Id.  After evaluating the studies conducted in 
multiple countries, Dr. Golombok concluded that there were no significant differences in the cognitive, social, and 
emotional development, of children of ART and that “assisted-reproduction children appear to be functioning well.”  
Id.  It should be noted, however that the majority of parents do not tell their children about the nature of their 
conception, and currently, it is not possible to establish the impact on children’s psychological development when 
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Another facet of the moral violation umbrella is the argument against the commodification of 
the human body.  This argument is most well known in the context of organ donation.160  The 
essence of the argument is that commodifying the human body by selling organs is an affront to 
the human existence because human body parts should not be treated as goods on a market.161  
Kenneth Baum correctly points out that this argument does not take into account the reality that 
the commodification of individual attributes, like intelligence, athleticism, the values placed on 
various body parts in personal injury cases, and people’s volunteering of their bodies for scientific 
research, is ubiquitous.162  He finds that the drawing of the line at organs, and particularly gametes, 
is entirely arbitrary.163  Whether or not one views such line-drawing as arbitrary, it is difficult to 
imagine that an argument rooted solely in morality could overcome strict scrutiny.   
A related argument is that human organs are prohibited from being sold under the federal 
National Organ Transplant Act (“NOTA” or “the Act”),164 and NOTA thus controls the sale of 
gametes.  NOTA, however, arguably does not apply to gametes because the term “human organ,” 
as used in the Act, is narrowly defined,165 and Congress did not intend for that definition to extend 
to replenishable tissues, such as blood or sperm.166  There is a major difference between the 
 
their parents do or do not disclose that the children were conceived through ART.  Id.; Anna Barbuscia, Mikko 
Myrskylä, & Alice Goisis, The Psychological Health of Children Born After Medically Assisted Reproduction , 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6351582/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (finding that studies suggest 
that the use of ART does not increase the risk that assisted-reproduction children will have psychological problems 
at the onset of adolescence). 
160 See Anya Adair & Stephen J. Wigmore, Paid Organ Donation: The Case Against , NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (Apr. 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3291132/  (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2020) (explaining the reasons why countries, like the United Kingdom, have outlawed the commodification 
of organs).   
161 See id.; Baum, supra note 104, at 134.   
162 See Baum, supra note 104, at 135-36.   
163 See Baum, supra note 104, at 136.  
164 2 U.S.C. 273-74 (2000).   
165 See 2 U.S.C. 274(c)(1), defining “human organ” as “the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, 
pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ . . . specified 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.”    
166 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992 (explicitly stating that 
“[t]he term ‘human organ’ is not intended to include replenishable tissues such as blood or sperm.”)  
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commodification of non-replenishable organs (like kidneys) and the commodification of gametes 
because eggs and sperm are plentiful and replenishable.167  The harm caused by commodifying 
gametes is therefore not of a serious, compelling nature.  Because the concerns about the 
commodification of transplant organs do not extend to the commodification of gametes, any 
reservation about a market for gametes is a mere moral misgiving that, like the speculative 
psychological harm to offspring, does not outweigh the right to utilize ART to procreate.   
Perhaps the strongest proffered justification for restricting or prohibiting compensation for 
gametes is the argument that compensation can lead to the exploitation of donors.  This argument 
is especially potent in the context of egg donors.  In the context of egg donation there is a greater 
chance of this occurring because of the large sums of money typically paid for donated eggs.168  
But both women and men who are financially desperate may be induced to donate without fully 
thinking through the burdens and risks to their health.169   
Although this justification certainly demonstrates tangible harm, it still does not pass as a 
compelling interest justifying restrictions or prohibitions on compensation for gametes.  This is 
because other, less intrusive means of preventing such exploitation exist.  These include placing 
limits on the number of donation cycles in which a donor can participate,170 eliminating or 
 
167 Although eggs are not replenishable, the sheer number of eggs the typical woman possesses arguably makes the 
donation of eggs different and less problematic than the donation of organs of a limited number, such as kidneys.  
Women have about 300,000 eggs at the time of puberty, only 300-400 of which are ovulated throughout a woman’s 
reproductive lifetime.  See Female Reproductive System, CLEVELAND CLINIC (Jan 19, 2019), 
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/9118-female-reproductive-
system#:~:text=During%20fetal%20life%2C%20there%20are,during%20a%20woman's%20reproductive%20lifeti
me. (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).   
168 See supra Section II.A.  As was noted earlier, the process of egg donation is complex and invasive.  Because of 
these features, the process is inherently riskier than that of sperm donation.  It also takes much more time to 
complete.  Women are paid large sums of money for the risks they take, as well as their time and inconvenience.  
These sums of money, rather than an altruistic motive, have likely induced women to donate eggs without fully 
considering the risks they will be taking.   
169 Because regulations regarding ART and gamete donations is for the most part unregulated, donors may also 
unwittingly end up with parental rights and obligations depending on the circumstances of the donation and the state 
in which they donate.  This, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.   
170 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 31.   
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significantly reducing coercive advertising,171 and most importantly, ensuring that there exists a 
robust informed consent process whereby potential donors are thoroughly educated about the risks 
and implications of donating their gametes.172  These less restrictive alternatives are not likely to 
drastically reduce the supply of gametes in the way that payment restrictions will.  Thus, the 




Eggs and sperm are the key ingredients for the operation and effective utilization of ART by 
individuals and couples wishing to exercise their right to reproduce.  Donors, though sometimes 
motivated by altruism, are more often motivated by financial incentives to donate.  Any law that 
diminishes the motivations to donate will ultimately reduce the supply of gametes, as has been 
proven in various countries with strict payment restrictions.  Regulations causing a lack of gametes 
are a direct infringement on the right to procreate for those who wish to utilize ART.  Intangible 
and speculative harms, as well as harms that can be addressed by less intrusive means, cannot be 
permitted to curtail the fundamental right to procreate guaranteed to all Americans.  
 
171 A common example of coercive advertising is the placing of ads guaranteeing exorbitant amounts of money in 
specific areas, like college campuses, where those likely viewing the ads are young, debt -laden adults that are prone 
to being unduly persuaded into donating.  Placing restrictions on these types of ads will likely not have a significant 
impact on the supply of gametes.   
172 This can be done by regulation that will likely not drastically reduce the supply of gametes.    
